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In certain parliamentary democracies, there are two major parties that move in and out of power
every few elections, and a third minority party that essentially never governs. We present a simple
model to account for this phenomenon, in which minority party supporters sometimes vote ideo-
logically (for their party) and sometimes strategically (against the party they like the least). The
competition between these disparate tendencies reproduces the empirical observation of two parties
that frequently exchange majority status and a third party that is almost always in the minority.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb (structures and organization in complex systems), 02.50.-r (probability theory)
I. INTRODUCTION
A feature of governance in several countries with parliamentary elections—typically British Commonwealth coun-
tries and Britain itself—is that two major parties move in and out of power every few elections, while a smaller third
party either has never or rarely governed. This lack of representation of the minority party occurs even though its
vote fraction can be close to that of the major parties.
Governance is determined by the party (or coalition) that has the majority of members of parliament (MPs). Each
MP is the candidate with the most votes in each parliamentary district election. This voting system makes it difficult
for a minor party to gain representation that mirrors its vote fraction. For example, if one party (out of three) receives
30% of the vote in every district while the other two parties equally share the remaining 70%, then the minority party
will have no MPs although it is supported by nearly 1 in 3 voters. As an illustration [1], in the 1983 British election,
the Conservative party won 42.4% of the popular vote and 397 seats (61.1% of 650 seats), the Labor party won 27.6%
of the vote and 209 seats (32.2% of 650), while the traditional third-place Liberal party won 25.4% of the vote but only
23 seats (3.56% of 650). Similarly, Canada had two major parties for much of the 20th century—Liberals (center-left),
Progressive Conservatives (center-right), and a smaller, but still national scale, New Democratic Party (leftist) that
has never governed [2, 3].
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FIG. 1: (a) British election results since 1830. (b) Canadian election results from 1935–90; here NDP/CC denotes the New
Democratic Party and its Cooperative Commonwealth party antecedent. (c) Representative simulation results for the time
evolution of the densities of the three states in the strategic voter model with state-dependent strategic bias for 50000 agents
and parameter x0 = 0.104 (see text for definition of x0).
To understand how such a voting pattern can arise, consider the case of the traditional minority Liberal party in
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2Britain. If their election fortunes seem promising, then supporters are likely to be galvanized to vote for their party.
However, if Liberal prospects seem bleak and the diametrically opposed Conservative party appears strong, a Liberal
may vote for the Labor party to forestall the Conservatives. This strategy clearly disfavors the minority party (Fig. 1).
In fact, when the number of parties is larger than two, ambiguous outcomes for the voting preference, such as the
Condorcet paradox [4], can easily arise. There is also a richer range of phenomenology than in two-party voting [5].
To account for the endemic weakness of a minority party, we introduce the “strategic” voter model that encapsulates
the strategic/ideological dichotomy outlined above. The original voter model [6] is a paradigmatic non-equilibrium
process that describes ordering in non-equilibrium systems and consensus in opinion dynamics [7]. In the voter
model, agents are endowed with a 2-state opinion variable. The dynamics is defined by picking a voter at random
and updating its opinion and repeating ad infinitum. In the update event, the agent adopts the opinion of a random
neighbor. Neighbors can be defined on a complete graph (interaction with any other agent equiprobably), across the
links of regular lattices [8] or complex networks [9], or on adaptive graphs [10]. Various extensions of the dynamics
itself have been considered [11].
In the next section, we define two natural versions of strategic voting and determine their dynamics in the mean-field
limit. Typically, the population is driven to a steady state where a single party is perpetually in the minority unless
the strategic bias is extremely weak. In the symmetric-breaking steady state, discrete fluctuations ultimately cause
the minority party to escape its minority status on a slow time scale. It appears possible that election results (Fig. 1)
would exhibit these same oscillations if the data continued for a much longer time period.
II. STRATEGIC VOTING
We consider a population of N voters on a complete graph that have three possible opinions states: A, B and
C. The idealized complete graph is used because of its simplicity and analytical tractability. Each of these states
is equivalent, in contrast to real political parties, and our model thus does not incorporate any subjective political
attributes. We denote the fractions of the three types of voters as a, b, and c. The state of each individual evolves by
the following voter-like dynamics:
• With rate T , a voter spontaneously changes to another state equiprobably. This thermalization step ensures
that consensus is never reached.
• With rate rij , a random pair of voters in states i and j is picked and one member of this pair adopts the state
of the other voter. In general, rij does not equal rji (see below).
In the mean-field limit (N →∞), the fractions of each voter species evolve according to the rate equations:
a˙ = T (b+ c− 2a) + rAC ac+ rAB ab
b˙ = T (c+ a− 2b) + rBA ba+ rBC bc (1)
c˙ = T (a+ b− 2c) + rCA ca+ rCB cb .
The terms proportional to T account for spontaneous opinion changes, while the remaining terms account for voter-
like updating. In the classic voter model [6, 15], each rαβ = 0, because a voter pair αβ can change to αα or to ββ
equiprobably; thus the density of each species is conserved. In our model, we only require rαβ + rβα = 0 to conserve
the total density.
For the strategic voter model, we take rαβ to be nonzero when one of α or β denotes a minority state. A simple
choice is a strategic bias that is independent of the fractions of each species, viz:
rAB = −rBA =


+r B minority,
0 C minority,
−r A minority,
(and cyclic permutations for rAC and rBC). Thus if B is in the minority, then an AB interaction favors the outcome
AA rather than BB because rAB > 0 and rBA < 0. Conversely, if A is in the minority, an AB interaction favors BB
rather than AA. If neither A or B are in the minority, then they undergo conventional voter dynamics in which their
average densities do not change. While it would be politically more realistic to have non-symmetric interactions in
which the minority species has a definite preference for one of the two non-minority species, this more complicated
model does not yield any additional insights about strategic voting.
3In the c< sector of the composition triangle (where c is in the minority, see Fig. 2), the rate equations reduce to:
a˙ = T (1− 3a) + rac
b˙ = T (1− 3b) + rbc (2)
c˙ = T (1− 3c)− rc(1 − c).
Here we use a+ b+ c = 1 to simplify the T -dependent terms and the last term in the equation for c˙. Similar equations
hold for the a< and b< sectors by cyclic permutations.
We will also study a more realistic strategic voting in which the strategic bias vanishes as the minority population
approaches those of the other two states. In terms of election sentiment, if a minority party supporter believes that
his/her party will win in an upcoming election, then there is every reason to vote ideologically with the party and
not strategically. For simplicity we consider the case where the strategic bias varies linearly in the depth of minority
status as quantified by the density-dependent strategic voting rate r = r0[(a + b)/2 − c] in Eqs. (2) (the c< sector),
and analogously for the other sectors of the composition triangle.
III. SOLUTION TO THE RATE EQUATIONS
A. Constant Strategic Bias
For a strategic bias with a fixed rate r, we solve the last of Eqs. (2) by rewriting it in the factorized form
1
r
dc
dt
= c2 − c (1 + 3x) + x ≡ (c− c+)(c− c−). (3)
Here x ≡ Tr quantifies the relative importance of the strategic bias (with strong bias corresponding to small x), and
c± =
1
2
[
(1 + 3x)±
√
1 + 2x+ 9x2
]
≡ 1
2
[
(1 + 3x)± 1
τ
]
.
We now apply a partial fraction expansion to Eq. (3) to render it integrable by elementary means and the solution is
c(t) =
c− − c+ C e−rt/τ
1− C e−rt/τ , where C =
c(0)− c−
c(0)− c+ . (4)
Thus c(t) converges to its steady-state value of c∗ = c− exponentially in time. The value of c
∗ sharply goes to zero as
x→ 0 because the strategic bias dominates, while c∗ gradually approaches the limiting value of 13 when x→∞ (see
Fig. 3(a)).
<c< b
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FIG. 2: Composition triangle showing the stable (dots) and unstable (circles) fixed points of the rate equations. The triangle
represents the locus of points a+ b+ c = 1 in the abc density space. Each sector is demarcated by separatrices, and the local
flow near one stable fixed point is shown. The heavy lines outline the c< sector where the density of c is in the minority.
For the majority density, we write the first of Eqs. (2) as a˙+ af = T , where f(t) ≡ 3T − rc(t), with formal solution
a(t) = T e−F (t)
∫ t
0
eF (t
′) dt′ + a(0) e−F (t) , (5)
4where
F (t) =
∫ t
0
f(t′) dt = 3T t− r
∫ t
0
c− − c+C e−rt′/τ
1− C e−rt′/τ dt
′ = − ln
[
1− C
1− C e−rt/τ
]
+
rt
2τ
[1− τ(3x − 1)].
Finally, we substitute the above result for F (t) into Eq. (5) and perform the integral to obtain
a(t) = a∗ − e
−rt/τ
1 + η
[ C(1− C)
1− Ce−rt/τ
]
+
[
a(0)− 2xτ {1 + C + η(1− C)}
(1 − C) {1− η2}
] [
(1− C)e−rt(1−η)/2τ
1− Ce−rt/τ
]
, (6)
and similarly for b(t). Here η ≡ (1− 3x)τ , and the steady-state densities are a∗ = b∗ = (1− c∗)/2. It is easy to check
that 0 < 1− η < 2, so that the approach to the steady-state is dominated by a(t)−a∗ ∼ e−rt(1−η)/2τ in Eq. (6), while
the minority species relaxes more quickly to stationarity: c(t)− c∗ ∼ e−rt/τ . The same considerations apply, mutatis
mutandis, in the a< and b< sectors of the composition triangle.
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FIG. 3: Simulation results for the fixed point minority concentration c∗ for: (a) a population of N = 5000 agents with constant
strategic bias as a function of x = T
r
, and (b) N = 50000 agents with state-dependent strategic bias as a function of x0 =
T
r0
.
The numerical value c∗, which agrees perfectly with the rate equation predictions, is determined by the time integral of the
concentration divided by the observation time. The change in behavior when x0 ≈
1
9
becomes a cusp as N →∞.
The non-trivial fixed points (dots in Fig. 2) are the basins of attractions for the a<, b< and c< sectors for any value
of the basic parameter x, and for almost all initial conditions (except for the special cases where all the densities
initially equal or only two densities are nonzero).
B. State-Dependent Strategic Bias
We now consider strategic bias with state-dependent rate r = r0[(a+ b)/2− c] in the rate equations (2). To simplify
technical details, we assume a = b (corresponding to an initial state a(0) = b(0)) throughout the evolution; thus the
normalization condition now is 2a+ c = 1. The rate equation for the minority density c in the c< sector now is:
c˙ = (1 − 3c)T − r0
2
c(1 − c)(1− 3c) ≡ −3r0
2
(c− c−)(c− c+)(c− c3), (7)
where c3 =
1
3 , c± =
1
2
(
1±√1− 8x0
)
, and x0 ≡ Tr0 . By plotting the right-hand side of Eq. (7) as a function of c, it
is clear that the stable fixed point value is c∗ = c− for x0 <
1
9 . In this case, any initial state in the c< sector flows
to the fixed point (1−c
∗
2 ,
1−c∗
2 , c
∗); this behavior is qualitatively similar to that of constant strategic bias. Conversely,
for x0 >
1
9 the stable fixed point is c
∗ = 13 , with c+ and c− both greater than
1
3 (Fig. 3, right). Thus a sufficiently
weak strategic bias or a sufficiently strong voting uncertainty, as quantified by x0 >
1
9 , leads to the fixed point
(13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) becoming stable. This change in the stability of the fixed points as a function of the basic parameter x0 is
an unexpected feature of state-dependent strategic voting.
To solve for the time dependence, we perform a partial fraction expansion to transform the rate equation (7) to
dc
[
1
c3 − c−
(
1
c− c3 −
1
c− c−
)
− 1
c3 − c+
(
1
c− c3 −
1
c− c+
)]
=
3
2
(c+ − c−)r0 dt.
5This equation can be straightforwardly integrated and the result is(
c(t)− c3
c(0)− c3
)−α3 ( c(t)− c+
c(0)− c+
)−α+ ( c(t)− c−
c(0)− c−
)−α−
= e3(c+−c−)r0t/2 , (8)
where
α± =
1
c3 − c± , α3 = α− − α+ =
c+ − c−
(c3 − c+)(c3 − c−) .
The main feature of this result is that the approach to the reactive steady state c(t) → c− is still exponential in
time, but the decay time can become quite long when the parameter x0 ≈ 19 . For example for x0 . 19 , the asymptotic
decay of the minority density is
c(t)− c− ∼ exp
[
−3r0
2
(c+ − c−)(c− − c3) t
]
. (9)
Thus as x → 19 where c− and c3 approach each other, the approach to the fixed point becomes very slow. On the
other hand, for x & 19 , the densities all decay to their common value of
1
3 as
c(t)− c3 ∼ exp
[
−3r0
2
(c3 − c+)(c3 − c−) t
]
. (10)
IV. INFLUENCE OF STOCHASTIC FLUCTUATIONS
In a finite population, the stochasticity of the dynamics allows the system to eventually escape the basin of attraction
of a fixed point. This escape corresponds to a minority party becoming one of the top two parties on a slow time
scale. To understand this escape dynamics, we formulate a discrete version of the strategic voter model for a fixed
population N , with NA agents of species A, NB of species B, NC of species C, with N = NA + NB + NC . This
population evolves by the reactions:
A
T−→
{
B
C
, B
T−→
{
A
C
, C
T−→
{
A
B
,
AB
r−→
{
AA
BB
, AC
r−→ AA , BC r−→ BB ,
for the case where C is in the minority. Corresponding rules apply when A and B are in the minority.
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FIG. 4: Average time span for a single party to have minority status versus population N for strategic voting with: (a) constant
strategic bias with x = 2 and (b) state-dependent strategic bias with x0 = 0.104; this latter value is chosen to give the same
steady-state minority densities for both models. Both time dependences are consistent with exponential growth in N .
The stochastic dynamics of the strategic voter model may be analytically described by a master equation whose
finite-size expansion [12, 13] leads to a Fokker-Planck equation. The fixed points in the rate equation then correspond,
6for finite N , to an effective attractor for the probability distribution. Because of finite-size fluctuations, the system
can escape such a potential well and thereby move between different attractors. This barrier crossing corresponds to a
change in the identity of the minority party. We can investigate this barrier crossing by rephrasing it as a first-passage
problem [12, 13, 15]. Following a standard calculation (as given, for example, in Ref. [14]), we find that changes in
the identity of the minority party occur on a time scale that grows exponentially in N [16], much longer than the
time scale of fluctuations between the majority and second-place parties.
We have tested this prediction by numerical simulations. The time span over which a given state is in the minority
as a function of the total population N does appear to grow exponentially with N for both constant and state-
dependent strategic bias, but with a much smaller amplitude for the latter case (Fig. 4). For the more realistic case of
a state-dependent strategic bias, simulations of single realizations exhibit changes in minority status on a time scale
that can be tuned to be in a similar range as that of election data (Fig. 1).
V. DISCUSSION
We proposed a strategic voter model to describe the feature whereby two major parties dominate in certain par-
liamentary democracies, while a third party remains in the minority. Our model is based on a strategic bias that
inherently disfavors the minority species. We studied two variants of strategic voting in which the strategic bias is
either fixed or state dependent. For fixed bias, the minority species is doomed to remain eternally in the minority in
the rate equation limit. For a state-dependent bias, a bifurcation occurs between a stable minority and equal densities
of the three parties as the strength of the strategic bias varies.
It is worth mentioning that our three-choice voting model has an important distinction with predator-prey models
that exhibit ”competitive exclusion”. This feature — known as Gause’s Law [17] — states that two species that
compete for the same resources cannot stably coexist if other ecological factors are constant. In our model, if
we consider the opinions as different species, the dynamics allow for spontaneous mutations and additionally the
interactions are not constant but state dependent. These features allow for a stable coexistence of all species.
For finite populations, stochastic fluctuations allow the minority party to escape its status on a time scale that
grows exponentially with population size. The concomitant slow oscillations in the identity of the minority party can
be readily seen in simulations, and this time evolution seems to roughly mirror real election data, especially if the
latter could be extended over a much longer time scale. However, to quantitatively match the election data, it would
be necessary to have a strategic bias that is still weaker than our state-dependent strategic voter model to reproduce
both the density difference between majority and minority and the time scale for a change in minority status.
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